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Our constitution is named a democracy, because it is in the hands not of the few but of the many. But our 
laws secure equal justice for all in their private disputes and our public opinion welcomes and honours, 
talent in every branch of achievement…on grounds of excellence alone… (Livingston, 1951). 
Abstract 
This paper will look into the side-effects of lack of meritocracy and the application of clientelistic practices 
in transitional societies and less mature democracies that lack pluralistic features. In these countries demo-
cratic practices need to be consolidated institutionally and within a normative-utilitarianist mode of govern-
ance in order to bring optimum results. Through an overt or covert spectrum of utilitarianism, lack of meri-
tocracy will be investigated against a number of independent variables such as brain drain, democratization, 
social stratification and clientelistic practices based on power relations between patron and clients. Implicit-
ly these relate to individual rights and social progress. The approach will seek causation patterns for the 
application of favouritistic practices through analyses of social and political given. In a causal relationship 
one event precedes another or the second event appears unlikely to have happened without the first even 
having occurred. The approach adopted is utilitarianist, normative, formulated through a twofold functional-
ist and liberal prism.   
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Introduction 
The application of a non-meritocratic model of governance is bound to be related to democracy, since its 
very essence is a central value in political and social life. Meritocracy is defined by “utility” as described by 
John Stuart Mill. To use Mill’s words in a post-descriptive way it should be imposed as a “condition of natu-
ral acceptance” (Mill, 1963). Undemocratic regimes and less mature democracies lack an egalitarian struc-
ture and do not dispose of an institutional premium that will allow smooth transition to reorganization and 
re-orientation of the state. This may be considered a prerequisite for an orchestrated and conscious effort to 
introduce a new cognitive and organizational mentality that will result in a revised model of governance 
operating on social accountability1.   
An equally demanding but also painstaking goal is the consolidation of pluralism and the creation of a truly 
open society2 where younger generations will provide the required human capital for the multilevel modern-
ization of transitional societies. These aims can best be achieved by consolidating democratic practices and 
introducing norms that have been applied in liberal democracies across the world. Political socialization 
(Voskopoulos, 2004) and meritocracy will enhance the process of establishing an open society of equal op-
portunities, transparency, accountability and efficiency.  
Pluralism, democracy, support for the rule of law and the establishment and eventual consolidation of a 
civic society cannot materialize fully unless less mature democracies in transition make best and most effi-
cient use of their human resources without social exclusions or the application of elitist practices that lead 
directly or indirectly to nepotism and brain drain. A truly civic society is one that provides equal opportuni-
                                                     
1 In its turn the issue is related to “non-discrimination, equality and inclusiveness” social values expected “to underlie the practice of 
development”. See Ackerman (2005: 2). 
2 Similar arguments are scrutinized in Popper (1973). 
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ties to all, a normative suggestion that makes meritocracy a value in itself and a moral code of governance. 
To the same direction points the claim that “the concept of civic society has a normative and mobilizing 
role…and is primarily a normative idea”1. Social life in transitional societies cannot be formulated within a 
framework of equality, consensus and social stability, unless clientelism, corruption and nepotism, the main 
but not exclusive obstacles to modernization, are marginalized. 
Meritocracy is a highly disputed issue, especially when it comes to narrow it down to the issue of equality of 
opportunity where merit might be defined by both talent and effort2. There is no general agreement as far as 
intervening and independent variables are concerned. The current analysis aims to avoid philosophical ex-
planations to meritocracy and selectively test it against a range of independent variables related to democra-
cy, governance and institutions.  
Meritocracy and brain drain 
One of the most burning social issues transitional societies have faced is the loss of human capital and a 
substantial brain drain, since young talented individuals have left their countries. Brain drain deprives the 
process of democratization of the necessary human capital which is expected to bear the load of applying 
new social, economic and political norms to modernize societies, their operational and institutional mode, as 
well as state apparatuses.  
A descriptive definition of meritocracy will provide understanding of how its lack breaks up the social web 
and constitutes a violation of civil and constitutional rights. “Meritocracy consists of a form of society in 
which educational and social success is the outcome of ability and individual effort” (Jary et al., 1995: 407). 
The definition does not mean to cover all aspects of meritocracy, but simply provide a general framework of 
individual evaluation for social advancement and mobility. By definition meritocracy is bound to lead to the 
creation of modern societies where success will result from proven intellectual and vocational abilities that 
can best serve public interest. As pointed out, “meritocracy emphasizes equality of competition rather than 
equality of outcome, assuming that positions in an occupational hierarchy will be obtained as a result of 
achievement on merit against universal, objective criteria” (Jary et al., 1995: 408). Under this spectrum, “no 
person of quality, competence or appropriate character should be denied the opportunity to achieve a com-
mensurate social status” (Jary et al., 1995: 408). The aforementioned suggestions practically imply that 
everyone should be evaluated on the same criteria and should be given the chance to socially advance in a 
society expected by its raison d’être to provide equal opportunities.  
Critics of meritocracy suggest that by strictly applying meritocratic norms one might exclude or marginalize 
a part of the society, individuals who were unfortunate, since social conditions did not provide them with the 
opportunity or material wealth to obtain qualifications and advance socially. This may be in part true and 
may be explained by a Marxist approach to the issue of (in)equality on the social level. Major critics of 
equality suggest that it can only “be achieved by the adoption of strategies which are designed to produce 
greater equality as an end product of the system rather than at its starting point” (Jary et al., 1995: 408). 
Despite the difficulty of devising undisputable, objective measures of ability, the most promising, qualified 
and talented should advance, particularly in societies undergoing social, economic and political reform.   
A normative evaluation of the gains of meritocracy should be the guiding social principle of those states 
being in the process of consolidating pluralism, the rule of law and democracy for several reasons.  
As a part of a causal relationship lack of meritocracy leads to brain drain, since a substantial number of 
young talented individuals are disillusioned and decide to seek employment abroad. The application of out-
dated practices, which, however, are not an exclusive feature of societies in transition, may reach such an 
extent that might affect the operational mode of democracy as a whole. The root of the problem lies in the 
primitive social and political systems of transitional societies and less mature democracies and the lack of a 
political culture3 that will allow domestic politics to be formulated outside the distorting framework of clien-
telism and favouritism. 
                                                     
1 See Pavlovic, V. (2001). A Suppressed Civil Society. In Blunden, M. and Burke, P. Democratic Reconstruction in the Balkans, Centre for the Study 
of Democracy, Westminster University, p. 41. 
2 For such an approach see Miller (1996: 277-301).  
3 Political culture is defined as “the attitudes, beliefs, and values which underpin the operation of a particular political system” (McLean, 1996: 379-380). 
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If the above requirements are of paramount importance to societies that have adopted pluralism, market 
economy and liberalism in politics, it is easy to comprehend why they are even more important to institu-
tionally backward societies and politically underdeveloped social and political systems in transition. Those 
factors interact and define the actual form of any system of social stratification, which will bring best results 
if the most qualified are used in a cost-effective, result-bearing way and become valuable human capital to 
be used to accelerate the process of transition. Eventually this might be the fastest way for these countries to 
modernize, since development does not have a static form. While transitional states advance, the same hap-
pens with the states that have become models for them. The continuous process will result in narrowing the 
gap between front-runners and “laggards” and bring optimum results only if qualitative elements of the tran-
sition process (meritocracy, transparency) overlay clientelistic practices, nepotism, gerontocracy and favour-
itism. Practically, this means that states in the process of development, re-organization and transition are 
expected to make even better use of their human capital, which is a national asset available and cheaper than 
any form of foreign aid. It also provides the human resources for continuous training of future generations 
which are bound to complete the modernization of the society.  
A third incentive for avoiding practices that do not favour meritocracy is the bad precedent that set to the 
moral character and operational mode of the society. In a political and social system in which clientelism 
and lack of meritocracy have become the common norm of social mobility, citizens engage in activities that 
allow only a small proportion of those able and qualified to advance and become an asset to the rest of the 
society. The message these practices convey to younger generations is that only association with political 
parties can provide a basis for social advancement. Similar practices formulate and eventually enhance the 
sense of social alienation an individual feels within the society and breaks up the social web by setting im-
penetrable walls and obstacles to those who have adopted an intellectual attitude to social issues without the 
patronization of particular political milieu. 
Finally, modernization, democratic transition and development cannot take place when societal norms are 
dominated by inequality in opportunities expressed by nepotism and clientelism. The modernization process 
should be characterized by effectiveness, accountability in all levels and maximum effective use of human 
resources. Those ought to be the ascriptive and normative elements of a modern, pluralistic society which 
aims at operating within a utilitarianist norm.  
Meritocracy is a sine qua non value in every society for reasons related to pluralism, efficiency, democracy 
and avoidance of social conflict. Individuals and political leaders need to adopt a normative attitude towards 
employment, which will impose moral principles and mobilize people so that affirmative action is taken. 
Similar practices will support the establishment of a true civil society. As pointed out, “a civil society en-
compasses institutions that are private in that they are independent from government” (Burke, 1883: 17). 
The above suggestion sets an operational and institutional prerequisite that is the separation and clear dis-
tinction between party mechanisms and public administration. It has been suggested that “the division be-
tween civic culture and the state reflects a private / public divide” (Heywood, 2000: 17), yet, it requires in-
stitutional arrangements not favoured by certain parts of the political elites. 
Clientelism as a deviation from democratic practices 
The concept of meritocracy as a social good is very old. Plato was amongst the first who looked into it and 
set it within the operational and normative framework of the society. When he referred to the social evils of 
his time he focused, inter allia, on disunity and incompetence. Lack of meritocracy refers indirectly to social 
disunity as the privileged ones constitute a clique within the society. Their social advancement is not based on 
principles, a concept on which Plato built many of his approaches to social issues.  
Clientelism (Eisenstadt et al., 1981; Clapham, 1982) has shaped mentality and behaviour in many politically 
and socially underdeveloped societies. It describes “informal power relations between individuals or groups in 
unequal positions, based on the exchange of benefits” (Bogdanor, 1991). The above descriptive definition 
provides the amoral framework of those practices, since they are based on mal-exercising of power through 
patron-client networks that create a closed stratification system with privileged groups. In sociological terms 
social closure operates on exclusion and marginalisation. In a clientelistic system “a person with higher status 
(the patron) takes advantage of his or her authority and resources to protect and benefit somebody with an 
inferior status (the client) who reciprocates with support and services” (Bogdanor, 1991). The above also 
describes a power relations framework based on exercising authority in a non-normative way. Although it is 
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clear that there is consensus on the part of the “client”, this is provided either because clientelism is viewed as 
the only means of social advancement or because the social partners do not dispose of an advanced political 
culture nor ethics. Eventually, is a clientelistic system is to be overthrown there appears to be no other alterna-
tives except a direct confrontation with the political establishment and the emergence of a modernizing elite. 
Clientelism affects above all the desired by many1 equality of opportunity and eliminates society from valuable 
human resources input.   
The 1990s catalytic changes in world politics and the ongoing globalization process impose, for the sake of 
effectiveness and competitiveness, the adoption of a normative model of governance. In its widest sense, 
“the term governance refers to the various ways through which social life is coordinated” (Heywood, 2000: 
19). The aforementioned coordination is related, inter allia, to accountability of the governing elites. A mod-
el of governance that legislatively imposes meritocratic rules and marginalizes clientelistic practices is 
bound to prove more efficient to societies that need to speed up the process of reorganization and transition 
of their economic, political and social models.  
Meritocracy and public ethics 
Clientelism and lack of meritocracy constitute a violation of civic and constitutional rights, since they over-
lay the goal of equality set by most constitutions of liberal states across the globe. Providing equal opportu-
nities in substance and above all common evaluation standards is a matter of public ethics. It is not merely a 
procedural issue but one to be defined by the goal it sets.  
In less mature democracies lack of meritocracy may characterize social life despite the typical, procedural 
application of principles. A democratic procedure may result in an unjust outcome. It is suggested that “an 
outcome is just if it is produced by some ideal democratic decision procedure” (Could, 1995: 198). In this 
case the criterion of justness is set strictly within a procedural framework and sees the outcome as a second-
ary goal. In an effort to avoid dysfunctionalities stemming from procedurally legitimized processes, it is 
necessary to focus on the right of individuals to question outcomes and set it within a general utilitarian 
framework. Under this spectrum, any decision should be scrutinized on the basis of the relation between 
democracy and justice.  
Those who benefit from clientelistic practices have made their choices based on a private ethics framework 
that cannot be imposed on them through violent means. A. Bentham had emphatically stated that “private 
ethics teaches how each man disposes himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness” 
(Thomas et al., 1992: 251). Hindsight has shown that private ethics are not compatible with public or social 
justice ethics. Individual livelihood and personal ambitions may be pursued at the expense of the general 
public’s livelihood or in a way that affects negatively the common good of an orderly society. A utilitarian 
and ethically-oriented approach is bound to set public ethics above private ethics and this can be realized by 
the introduction of a legal system with clear-cut goals and transparent practices. Bentham made a useful 
suggestion claiming that “we must know what the dictates of legislation are before we can know what the 
dictates of private ethics are” (Thomas et al., 1992: 253). The ontological question that rises is whether these 
dictates simply aim at legitimizing outcomes and private ethics or impose norms of social justice and an 
equal opportunity framework. In less mature democracies legislation may be used to impose or “legitimize” 
private ethics and overlay transparency. In these societies the legal system may function as a means of en-
suring that outdated norms survive the modernization process.  
Inequality in opportunities directly or indirectly refers to a certain social Darwinism, in societies where the 
fittest, meaning those who have become parts of a corrupt socio-political system, survive. Social Darwinism 
consists of a system in which “the strongest individuals in society eventually prevail and form a state to 
strengthen and maintain their dominance” (Rush, 1992: 27). 
Clientelism, nepotism and lack of meritocracy provide an overlapping, intermingled operational framework 
of exercising power within the defined borders of a state. To this day, the state-centric model allowed ample 
institutional and operational space for the application of clientelistic practices. In a way, clientelism and 
nepotism, and in certain cases gerontocracy, may be identified with the operational mode of the nation-state 
and its exclusive right to exercise power at will within its territorial base. In certain cases this led to the crea-
                                                     
1 In the US for instance a vast majority of 90% believe that “equality of opportunity is an absolutely American ideal”. See 
https://edeq.stanford.edu/sections/meritocracy. 
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tion of a minimal state1, meaning a state whose interests did not identify completely, if at all, with the inter-
ests of the majority of people. Communist regimes of the past and certain Islamic countries where religious 
fundamentalism prevailed, or oligarchies, dispose of features of a minimal state whose operational mode is 
based on overt or covert coercion. Yet, coercion is not an operational characteristic of liberal democracies, 
as those are built on consensus on the part of social partners. 
Clientelism and power relations in a social context 
Bertrand Russell defined power as “the production of intended effects” (Russel, 1938: 35). Under this spec-
trum, in the case of clientelism, those intended effects aim at providing fertile ground for social mobility 
only within a certain milieu. Similar practices result in breaking up the social web by forming small cores of 
privileged individuals and a great social margin of underdogs (the underclass) outside an accountability 
framework. Accountability is often synonymous with answerability and refers to “the duty to explain one’s 
conduct and be open to criticism by another” (Heywood, 2000: 117), while it is an operational, normative 
feature of democracy. In certain cases answerability is overlaid by legalistic dictates in order to legitimize 
inequality of opportunity.   
Lack of meritocracy points to civic deficit and reflects unwillingness, on the part of the state, to apply social 
justice rules. To this direction points the statement that “law is made by the government…reflects the will of 
the state…and…takes precedence over all other norms and social rules” (Rush, 1992: 24). Political clien-
telism affects the operational and normative mode of democratic government, while meritocracy should be 
seen as a social good and a matter of social justice2. 
Clientelism and social stratification 
In sociological terminology social stratification describes the different layers, or strata in a society (Saun-
ders, 1992: 1). In liberal democracies those layers are not isolated amongst them, a fact that allows horizon-
tal and vertical social mobility. Social stratification analysis focuses, inter allia, on understanding and pin-
pointing the sources of inequality and lack of social mobility as formulated through the distribution of power 
on the social level. Long established and practiced clientelism tends to prevent social groupings or individu-
als to move up the social ladder and affects the way these groups relate to one another and interact.  
The sociology literature has focused on the issue of equality, particularly equality of opportunity, question-
ing the extent to which it is sociably desirable and realistic. Equality of opportunity is “the idea that all per-
sons, regardless of class, age, race or gender, should have equal rights to compete for and attain sought-
after positions in society”3. The provision of equal opportunities aims at achieving a more equal and just 
distribution of society’s wealth, an aim that links equal opportunity to social stratification. Clientelism and 
nepotism support directly or indirectly the unequal distribution of wealth, since those individuals and groups 
associated with state power dispose of the material resources that constitute a qualitative and quantitative 
advantage over the underprivileged ones. Equality of opportunity supports the creation of an egalitarian 
society, which, however, cannot be established without the enhancement of the rule of law and the norma-
tive integration of societies built on values, values consensus4 and social justice. 
Meritocracy will prevent the establishment of a sub-culture of underprivileged within the society. It is plau-
sibly noted that “the relationship of the sub-culture to the dominant culture has been identified as one of 
subordination and relative powerlessness” (Jary et al., 1995: 665). In transitional societies and less mature 
democracies clientelism and lack of meritocracy constitute the dominant sub-culture divide.  
In liberal democracies the concept of equality has a prominent place and focuses, inter allia, on the crucial 
right to fair selection. The semiotics and practical aspect of the lack of this right refers to the Darwinian 
motto of the survival of the (socially) fittest and functions against any framework of political and social 
ethics. Social Darwinism and an ethical application of a normative model of governance are incompatible 
almost by definition.  
                                                     
1 For the notion of minimal and maximal state see Buzan (1983). 
2 For the contended concepts of social justice and morality see Sterba et al. (1995).  
3 See Collins Dictionary of Sociology, op., cit., p. 202. 
4 This is reflected in the work of Talcott Parsons and structural functionalism (Parsons, 1977; 1971).  
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Despite the divergent views on the issue, patronage, whose extended form is clientelism, leads to the mar-
ginalisation of those not associated with the state’s power centres. In transitional societies lacking a plural-
istic structure and democratic background, clientelism is endemic, it affects social stratification and overlays 
individual civic rights. Similar practices result in social immobility, brain drain and a waste of human capi-
tal. Furthermore, a clientelistic social and political framework of exercising power leads to social alienation 
defined as “an individual’s feeling of estrangement from a situation, group or culture” (Heywood, 2000: 
13) and does not allow for individual social mobility, thus undermining basic principles and values of liberal 
democracy.  
Meritocracy may be seen as an expression of Kantian moral philosophy, while, in societies undergoing tran-
sition there is a need to apply a meritocracy habeas corpus to protect constitutional rights or, in their ab-
sence, to introduce them. This will allow the protection of the social order and individual civic rights. Socio-
logical research provides the intellectual tools to tackle these issues. The sociology of education in particular 
focuses on education and social order particularly with the normative suggestions of Durkheim (1956) who 
suggested that the process of education “was to be understood in terms of its contribution to the promotion 
and maintenance of the social order” (Jary et al., 1995: 631). However, social order in liberal democracies 
cannot be maintained in an atmosphere of inequality of opportunity, which overlays the political and moral 
obligation of the governing elite. Similar practices underpin, inter allia, the inefficiency of the nation-state to 
protect the livelihood of those housed under its social and political structure.  
Leaderships in transitional countries are expected to provide an institutional premium so that younger gener-
ations have a fair chance in advancing in the emerging social order. Maybe the most powerful incentive for 
young people is the prospect of their abilities being acknowledged by political elites and their social ad-
vancement on merit institutionally protected. Roy Macridis points out that “freedom of thought and expres-
sion, protections against government in the form of personal and civil rights, have little value if the individ-
uals are not given a proper recognition so that they can work and live in accordance with their talents and 
capabilities. Social liberty corresponds to what we refer today as opportunities for advancement or social 
mobility” (Macridis, 1986: 25).  
As noted by Moore and Davis, and according to the functionalist theory1, “social stratification comes into 
existence as an institutionalized form and persists as the device by which societies ensure that the most im-
portant positions are filled by the most qualified” (Moore, 1978; Moore and Davis, 1945). In a transitional 
phase this is of paramount importance, since “the positions which carry the greatest rewards and the high-
est rank are those which have the greatest importance for society and also require the greatest training or 
talent” (Moore and Davis, 1945). 
Meritocracy and the rule of law 
Political and social phenomena such as clientelism and lack of meritocracy cannot be analyzed in a social 
vacuum outside the general operational framework of a society. As pointed out, “the rule of law, civil socie-
ty, and democracy are interdependent”2. Moreover, “the rule of law is a condition of both democratic state 
and a developed civil society”3. Both statements imply a certain complementarity. In the absence of one, 
those factors do not function or malfunction.   
However, meritocracy may be absent even within a democratic society, since the application of the law may 
go beyond the constitutional dictates of equality. The laws may also be used in a legalistic way rather than 
constitute a social premium against inequality. The suggestion leads to a number of ontological questions:  
Can our commitment to democratic process allow for decisions or laws democratically arrived at that violate 
the requirements of justice? (Could, 1995: 193). 
To what extent a law serves public interest and transparency? 
Can a law have a Janus-like effect on social justice?  
It has been suggested that “the rule of law is an essential element and a precondition of modern civil socie-
                                                     
1 For a critique of the functionalist theory of social stratification see Tumin (1953). 
2 See Vojislav Stanovcic (2009). The Rule of Law and Civil Society” in M. Blunden and Patrick Burke (eds.). Democratic Recon-
struction in the Balkans, op., cit., p. 93. 
3 Ibid, p. 94. 
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ty…while its existence depends on rules which regulate various conflicts and relations between its members and 
autonomous parts of the society”1. Emphasis is given on the regulatory basis of the rule of law. 
Meritocracy positively affects interactions amongst social partners and allows social stratification to be formulat-
ed on merit. Its lack constitutes absence of rule of law and is most often attributed to an etatic system controlled 
by political parties, namely those in power. As pointed out, “a developed civil society actually requires social 
pluralism and limited state power”2. Yet, state power remains substantial in a state-centric world, and this under-
pins the need for a new model of governance in which the state exists but operates on a normative basis. In those 
societies characterized by a pluralistic deficit, there is also the need to reshape the relationship between the 
operational mode of the state and the society. Such a quest can only materialize if inequality practices are 
marginalized. Under this spectrum, clientelism and nepotism constitute an operational system of inequality. 
The protection of individual rights is a requirement for justice and this may be more important than any 
procedural orthodoxy. One approach sees justice “either as equal liberty or as equal consideration of inter-
ests”i. The later is basic to the establishment of a meritocratic social order as lack of meritocracy overlays 
the interests of certain individuals and advances decisively those of a few privileged. Robert Dhal had also 
pointed out the value of equal consideration of interests (Could, 1995: 196).  
Clientelism and education 
Education functions as a sub-system of the society (Dahl, 1989: 97-105), a means of political socialization, 
and provides the fundamental framework of future interactions amongst individuals and groups within a 
society. The efficiency of the educational system will define to a great extent the quality of this interaction 
and the form of relations amongst social partners or individuals. The role of education is not simply to pro-
vide vocational and intellectual tools for social advancement but also to provide the normative, ethical basis 
of future interaction. This function should be seen as an extension of an educator’s duty to the society. In the 
same way university authorities punish those plagiarizing for not behaving in an ethical way, an educational 
system should “indoctrinate" students with respect for socially acceptable norms, which, in a democratic 
social organization, ought to be orientated towards a normative, value-oriented basis. It is plausibly suggest-
ed that “education systems provide a basis for determining what is and what is not acceptable social conduct 
and the means by which individuals are introduced to and taught the common values of the society” (Dahl, 
1989: 97-105). Yet, what the aforementioned suggestion takes for granted is that all social partners or indi-
viduals in a given society adopt the same values, thus undermining social conflict and divergence of inter-
ests. It also overlays the fact that in transitional societies the educational system is in the process of liberali-
zation, thus, it is characterized by a certain structural and institutional vacuum.  
One of the scopes of the educational system is to operate as a socializing intellectual process unlike J. S. 
Mill’s isolating experience (Thomas et al., 1992: 248) and a means to familiarize individuals with societal 
norms. Practically education is required to provide the ethical foundation of the society, which, once accept-
ed, will enhance normative social order necessary to provide social stability based on justice, social cohe-
sion and integration. It will also assist the formulation of an attentive public that will adopt a critical stance 
towards governance. As noted, “clientelistic and charisma-based party systems have a chance to survive as 
long as they deal with unsophisticated, uneducated voters for whom the discrepancy between democratic 
rules and party performance is not noticeable or problematic” (Kitschelt, 1995: 241; 449-450). The educa-
tional system has the potential to initiate the necessary changes in terms of ideology and institutions to cre-
ate a new social mental model of advancement. 
Conclusions 
In politically underdeveloped societies, clientelism acquires the form of a political ideology inducing people 
to act in a specific self-centred way and becomes a non-normative state ideology. J. Plamenatz has defined 
ideology as “a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or commu-
nity”(Plamenatz, 1970: 15). Ideology directly or indirectly leads or influences the political culture and the 
foundation of its functioning mode. On the social level, the side-effects may be epitomized in alienation 
(Macridis, 1986: 303) or estrangement as opposed to “integration” or “participation” (ibid). In these socie-
                                                     
1 See Vojislav Stanovcic, op., cit., p. 93. 
2 Ibid, p. 95. 
  SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 1, Issue 4, 2017 
57 
ties it affects the pattern of social stratification, social mobility and supports a political system with distinc-
tive features of inequality in opportunities. 
Political socialization and participation may provide powerful tools of bringing about social changes and 
imposing normative practices on a basis of accountability and transparency in a functioning open society. As 
noted, “the vision of open societies calls for an expanded role for democratic citizens”1. A normative social 
order comprises of values and norms that support an open society with no exclusions. Basic freedoms may 
be existent in a society but may be self-annulled if they do not go along with distinctive qualitative features 
such as equality of opportunities, meritocracy and social liberty. Nepotism, imposed by a collectivity, vio-
lates basic moral principles of liberalism2 and affects social liberty while it refers to traditional societies 
where recognition and social status was determined by birth. On the contrary, in modern societies, build on 
social justice, status is expected to be achieved on merit3 and individual performance. 
Appointing people on merit is sensible in a wider utilitarianist way on two levels: societal and individual. 
First, lack of a meritocratic system4 leads to the establishment of a new social environment and eventually a 
social stratification model that leaves no room for others, thus depriving the modernization process from its 
human dynamic. Second, lack of meritocracy5 does not allow people to realize their capacities by limiting oppor-
tunities. In its turn this affects an individual’s psychology since it deprives them of encouragement and 
recognition. Recognition is a great motivator for excellence and contribution and relates to self-esteem. 
“People define themselves in part by the extent to which others praise and appreciate them. Each person 
responds to signals from those around him, working hard at activities that win praise and abandoning those 
that don’t. An individual’s growth, then, is a joint project of the self and society. In this joint project indi-
viduals not only improve their capacities; they also come to realize that they cannot fully succeed unless 
they make a contribution to the society that helped to shape them”. 
Liberalisation directly and indirectly refers to aspects of liberty which, in its Platonian sense, refers directly 
to democracy. However, this should become a leading state ideology behind governance. In any other case 
the few privileged will still advance on a sole basis of being the beneficiaries of nepotism. Meritocracy con-
stitutes an ethical debate in transitional societies and less mature democracies in the process not only of 
democratisation but also the establishment of a system of values. Yet, if meritocracy is to serve a generally 
applied utilitarianist purpose it should ensure equal “opportunities to develop merit” an issue that brings into 
the ultilitarianist equation the issue of “fair equality of opportunity”6. 
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